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A Fair Return Approach to
Pharmaceutical Compulsory
Licensing
Maura Nuno
This article argues that universal access to drugs requires
not only collaboration between nations and patent holders, but
also the creation of a neutral International Panel. Under the
supervision of a Neutral International Panel, the disequilibrium
created by the current system of global intellectual property
protection can be equalized to improve access to drugs without
undermining pharmaceutical companies and intellectual property
rights.
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I. Introduction
Innovation is the solution to global health problems, but as long
as innovators are not inherently altruistic, the developing world will
be deprived of access to life saving drugs. Under the current
framework for the protection of intellectual property, pharmaceutical
companies receive property protection and set market prices. The
framework allows pharmaceutical companies to justify their supracompetitive prices based on the need to recuperate innovation
J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law; B.A., Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, June
2012.

395

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016)
A Fair Return Approach to Pharmaceutical Compulsory Licensing

expenses. Because drug development is timely and expensive, with a
high risk of failure, governments are inclined to provide
pharmaceutical companies with strong intellectual property protection
and greater profit margins than would exist in a competitive system
to induce them to assume the risks.1 The genius of the patent system
is that it harnesses the market system to determine the reward for
patent holders. However, this means that access is determined by the
ability to pay, and some people may be deprived of access.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) established the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement
to strike a balance between protecting patent holders and giving the
public access to inventions. The agreement included a provision for
compulsory licensing that would permit a government to allow
someone else, usually a generic manufacturer, to produce a drug
without the explicit consent of the patent owner. Although TRIPS
defined certain qualifications for issuing compulsory licenses, countries
retained broad discretion over when to grant compulsory licenses and
how to establish adequate remuneration. The Doha Declaration,2
enacted in 2001, was intended to clarify some of the confusion about
compulsory licenses but instead left the adequate remuneration
language untouched and did little to coordinate the international
system.3

1.

Industry figures show that on average, pharmaceutical companies spend
$1.3 billion on research and development of a new drug over a period of
ten to twelve years. This figure suggests not all drugs cost the same but
fails to detail the distribution of cost around this average. WAYNE
TAYLOR, PHARMACEUTICAL ACCESS IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: ON
THE GROUND BARRIERS AND INDUSTRY SUCCESS 8 (2010),
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s17815en/s17815en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5JYW-3AWH].

2.

The Doha Declaration recognized that member nations should not strive
to uphold the TRIPS Agreement at the expense of the nations’ public
health. The clarification embodied in the Doha Declaration resulted
from an increasing concern over public health problems affecting the
developing and least-developed countries. See World, Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2
(Nov. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_tri
ps_e.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6MD-AZV8].

3.

The Doha declaration did try to improve access to some drugs by
allowing countries to use their power to issue compulsory licenses to
support the production of generic drugs for export. However, the effort
has proven to be insufficient and leaves the current system of state-bystate policy making relatively untouched. See Alan O. Sykes, Public
Health and International Law: TRIPS Pharmaceuticals, Developing
Countries, and the Doha “Solution”, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47 (2002).
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Even if consumers from countries housing the top-ten largest
pharmaceutical companies can feasibly pay the market price for
drugs, these same prices shut out consumers in the developing world.
The existing framework of TRIPS creates a reciprocal arrangement
between countries where all member countries must recognize and
protect each others’ domestic intellectual property rights.4 The
arrangement is challenged when developing nations are forced to
choose between upholding intellectual property rights and granting
their citizens access to medicines. In those instances, developing
nations resort to compulsory licensing. As a result, both patent
holders and countries are subject to criticism, litigation, and monetary
loss for their respective actions concerning the compulsory license.
This Note proposes the establishment of a neutral International
Panel to review pharmaceutical compulsory licenses and provide
patent holders with an impartial review of adequate remuneration.
Part I introduces the paradigm created by the need for innovation
matched against society’s ability to pay market prices. Part II
outlines the global system of intellectual property protection under
TRIPS and Part III deconstructs the consequences of imposing a
global patent system with no global coordination. Part IV proposes
the creation of an International Panel specifically designed to
exclusively entertain disputes over pharmaceutical compulsory
licenses. Establishing a neutral International Panel for compulsory
license disputes should ameliorate the struggle between
pharmaceutical companies and developing countries while increasing
global access to life saving drugs.

II. Innovation Costs vs. Ability to Pay
The patent system is premised on compensating innovators for
the costs and risks associated with developing new ideas through
temporary market control.5 Patent rights assume a system at
equilibrium where innovators will recover the costs of innovation
without surplus or supra-competitive gains. On a national scale, this
system is thought to assure that innovators will have the incentive to
invest in research and that the public will enjoy the benefits of their
innovation. The system harnesses the market by requiring those who
benefit from the drug to pay the cost of investing in the drug. But,
once domestic patent protection rights are engrafted on other

4.

Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, WORLD TRADE
ORG., available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/8XUU-HV7U] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).

5.

See Stanley M. Bensen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law
and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (1991).
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countries who make individual and disconnected decisions about
access to medicines, the equilibrium of the system is disturbed.
In developed countries, access to drugs is regulated by national
governments and insurance systems, which can determine “how to
spread the financial burden of the system among potential
beneficiaries.”6 Governments can also choose to subsidize the cost of
innovation through government-funded research or the healthcare
system.7 In contrast, the developing world lacks the infrastructure or
system to spread the financial burden across beneficiaries.
Furthermore, there is no coordination between countries concerning
the reward for innovation and the ability of each country to pay. This
uncoordinated system of international patent rights leads countries to
take unilateral action to the detriment of patent holders and the
TRIPS agreement as a whole. For example, in 1997, Brazil passed
legislation authorizing a local company to produce a specific medicine
without the consent of the patent holder.8 In this example, Brazil took
unilateral action to remedy insufficient access to that medication in
its country without negotiating with the patent holder’s country of
origin.
Without an International Panel, it is impossible to fairly
determine whether pharmaceutical companies are being over or
undercompensated for their innovations. Further, there is no way to
resolve the distributive issue — “the determination of which . . .
countries should bear the burden of providing the incentive”—without
a coordination system.9 In fact, even with a presiding International
Panel, the distributive issue would be difficult to resolve given the
concentration of pharmaceutical companies in only a handful of
countries.

III. The Current System
TRIPS was enacted to promote the transfer and dissemination of
technology through the protection and enforcement of intellectual

6.

Peter Gerhart, The Tragedy of TRIPS, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 155
(2007).

7.

Cutting American Health Research Will Harm the World, ECONOMIST
(Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/science-andtechnology/21572735-cutting-american-health-research-will-harm-worldbad-medicine [https://perma.cc/MK2M-PYZG].

8.

Christie Mount, Brazil’s Defiant AIDS Program: A Model for the
Developing World, COUNCIL HEMISPHERIC AFF. (July 30, 2013),
http://www.coha.org/brazils-defiant-aids-program-a-model-for-thedeveloping-world/ [https://perma.cc/9ZV7-BJ6E].

9.

Gerhart, supra note 6, at 158.
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property rights10 by establishing “minimum levels of protection that
each government has to give to the intellectual property of fellow
WTO members.”11 When a member government determines its
citizens cannot pay the market price for a drug, they are first
encouraged to seek voluntary licenses from the patent holder. Under a
voluntary license, the petitioning country is authorized to use
patented material by the patent holder under “reasonable commercial
terms.”12 Additionally, Article 31 of TRIPS creates an exception to
the exclusive right of the patent holder to determine the drug supplier
and manufacturer. Under Article 31, a member government may allow
“someone else to produce the patented product or process without the
consent of the patent owner,” therefore issuing a compulsory license.13
Before a government may issue a compulsory license, the proposed
user must show proof of unsuccessful attempts to obtain a voluntary
license over a “reasonable period of time.”14 Further, the agreement
provides an additional exception in cases of “national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public noncommercial use,” where the issuing government need not demonstrate
an initial attempt to obtain the patent holder’s authorization before
issuing a compulsory license.15
Despite the exception to strong intellectual property protection,
the compulsory license issuer must pay “adequate remuneration in the
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of
the authorization.”16 The language of TRIPS fails to delineate a
process for determining adequate remuneration and therefore gives the
issuing government wide discretion in determining appropriate royalty
rates. As such, the issuing country may unilaterally decide to issue a
compulsory license once favorable negotiations cannot be met and set
the royalty rate according to their own measures of adequacy. Access
to drugs is an important consideration for TRIPS and by demanding
10.

See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, art. 1, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].

11.

Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WHO, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/HZP3-UHQC] (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).

12.

Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WTO, available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.ht
m [https://perma.cc/5J66-8WU3] (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).

13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.

TRIPS supra note 10, at art. 31(b).

16.

TRIPS, supra note 10, at art 31(h).

399

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016)
A Fair Return Approach to Pharmaceutical Compulsory Licensing

royalty rates, no matter how minimal, it ensures pharmaceutical
companies will at least obtain some profit from developing nations,
which they would not otherwise receive because citizens of developing
countries could never purchase the drugs at market value.
Further complicating the paradox created by the ambiguity of
“adequate remuneration,” the agreement provides that the judiciary
branch or some higher authority from the issuing country shall review
determinations about remuneration for compulsory licenses.17 A
pharmaceutical company dissatisfied with the compulsory license or
the issuing country’s determination of what constitutes adequate
remuneration must seek relief through that nation’s judicial system.
In order for that clause to be carried out successfully, the countries
issuing compulsory licenses would need to provide a mechanism for
impartial review.
Pharmaceutical companies that have attempted to challenge
compulsory licenses using the issuing nation’s laws failed and
significantly damaged their public image in the process.18 In November
of 2001, WTO members met in Doha, Qatar to clarify ambiguities in
the TRIPS agreement and to pacify the developing nations unsatisfied
with the current interpretation of TRIPS so that new negotiation
rounds could be commenced.19 The Doha Declaration provided an
authoritative interpretation of TRIPS so that members would
recognize another member’s right to take measures to protect public
health and promote drug access.20 The Doha Declaration changed the
provision in the TRIPS Agreement that restricted compulsory licenses
to mainly supply the domestic market.21 The new understanding of the
Article 31 exception allows countries unable to manufacture drugs
domestically to obtain cheaper versions from other countries.22
Additionally, the least developed countries may delay conformity to
the TRIPS minimum standards of protection for pharmaceutical
17.

TRIPS, supra note 10, at art 31(j).

18.

See Ellen F. M.’T Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to
Essential Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 3031 (2003) (discussing the backlash that drug companies faced for
challenging the South African legal framework).

19.

Carlo Trojan, The Developing Countries Came of Age in Doha, EUR.
AFF. (2002), available at
http://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/component/content/article
?id=389:the-developing-countries-came-of-age-in-doha
[https://perma.cc/K43R-XVLV] (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).

20.

James Love, Measures to Enhance Access to Medical Technologies and
New Methods of Stimulating R&D, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 682
(2007).

21.

Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, supra note 12.

22.

Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, supra note 12.
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patents until 2016.23 Therefore, the least-developed countries, not yet
required to meet the minimum standards of protections, should not
benefit from the compulsory license exception until after 2016. As a
result, developing countries will be the most active players on the
compulsory licensing agenda.

IV. Disequilibrium in the Current System
The existing framework for global intellectual property protection
of pharmaceuticals compensates pharmaceutical companies for
research and development costs at the expense of global access to life
saving drugs. Not only does the framework give inadequate attention
to access, but the inadequacies lead to: (1) insufficient royalty
payments under compulsory licenses and no proper judicial oversight;
(2) damaging public relations incidents; (3) neglect of orphan diseases;
and (4) a rise in the counterfeit drug market. The shortcomings of the
existing framework are the result of uncoordinated distribution costs
leaving pharmaceutical companies and developing countries alike
dissatisfied with the status quo. Imposing impartial oversight for
compulsory licenses would result in overall greater global access to
drugs and the emergence of untapped markets.
A. Insufficient Royalty Payments under Compulsory Licensing

The patent system rewards innovators for assuming the risk and
cost of research and development by giving patent owners the right to
exclude others from using or producing their product for a certain
amount of time so that they may recoup their expenses. Under the
premise of recovering the cost of research and development,
pharmaceutical companies are free to set inaccessibly high market
prices for their drugs. This means, that some countries, those with
citizens that can’t afford market prices and where government
subsidies are not enough to make the drugs affordable, are effectively
forced to request a voluntary license or unilaterally issue a compulsory
license to provide their citizens with access to certain drugs. Because
voluntary licensing involves negotiations between two highly
interested parties, the government seeking a voluntary license and the
patent holder, negotiations are unlikely to result in terms agreeable to
both. Thus, voluntary licenses are usually issued as a result of public
pressure or legal action.24 And even though the WTO imposes an
23.

Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, supra note 12.

24.

TAHIR AMIN, VOLUNTARY LICENSING PRACTICES IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR: AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO IMPROVING
ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE MEDICINES? 13 (2007), available at
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/129694/1099999/1192729231567/
Oxfam++Voluntary+Licensing+Research+IMAK+Website.pdf?token=WmNw
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unwritten obligation on members to bargain in good faith,
governments seeking a voluntary license bargain with the knowledge
that if agreeable terms cannot be established they may unilaterally
issue a compulsory license. This system imposes high bargaining costs
for pharmaceutical companies faced with the possibility of compulsory
licenses and the notion that there is no widely accepted international
standard for reasonable return rates.
Allowing each country issuing a compulsory license to set its own
royalty rate effectively deprives pharmaceutical companies of any
control over the return rate for their inventions. In such a system,
there is no guarantee to the patent owner that a royalty rate will not
be disproportionally low or high to the country’s actual ability to pay.
Countries issuing compulsory licenses are encouraged to adopt the
Remuneration Guidelines for Non-Voluntary use of a Patent on
Medical Technologies (Remuneration Guidelines) created by WHO
and the Bureau for Development Policy of the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) because they are the simplest, but
countries can choose any of the existing guidelines or even develop
their own.25
Most guidelines use a base rate of 4 percent that can be adjusted
for special circumstances including the country’s rank in the Human
Development Index, utilization factor, and therapeutic value.26 WHO
Remuneration Guidelines adjust the 4 percent base rate by plus or
minus 2 percent for the product’s therapeutic value or the
government’s role in financing research and development.27 A trifle
two-percent plus-or-minus difference cannot be expected to account
for the wide range of varying circumstances affecting each applicant.
Moreover, with each country being free to choose with guidelines to
use there can be no consistency among countries. Using these
guidelines, pharmaceutical companies cannot expect to obtain a fair
return on their innovations.
India’s negotiations with the pharmaceutical company Bayer are a
recent example of an ineffective license agreement under the current
system. In 2012, India issued its first compulsory license for Nexavar,
a compound used to treat advanced stages of kidney and liver

mWc9nyaS%2B%2BPM0t2TRNXi4k4%3D [https://perma.cc/E5AS8N9z].
25.

Love, supra note 20, at 688-689.

26.

Love, supra note 20, at 688-689.

27.

JAMES LOVE, WORLD HEALTH ORG., REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR
NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT 7 (Robert Weissman ed., 2005),
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications
/hiv-aids/access-to-drugs-via-compulsory-licensing-guidelines--nonvoluntary-patent-use/22.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE59-HCNK].
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cancer.28 Bayer obtained a license to import Nexavar into India in
2007, but did not import Nexavar in 2008 and only imported the drug
in small quantities in 2009 and 2010.29 Under Indian intellectual
property law, failing to work a patent domestically is cause for
forfeiture of the patent, which has gradually turned into a system of
compulsory licensing instead.30 In response, Natco Pharmaceutical, a
national drug manufacturing company, applied for a compulsory
license and was granted authorization to produce Bayer’s patented
cancer drug for domestic sale with a 6 percent royalty rate on net
sales of the drug payable to Bayer on a quarterly basis.31
During negotiations for a voluntary license, the initial step in this
process, Bayer requested royalty payments of 15 percent of net sales,
but negotiations failed and India granted Natco Pharmaceutical a
compulsory license.32 Bayer appealed the grant of the compulsory
license to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (“IPAB”) who
upheld the order, but raised the royalty rate to 7 percent.33 In their
considerations, the board dismissed Bayer’s argument for
remuneration noting “expenditure incurred by the appellant is not the
criterion, nor does this chapter intend[] that the patentee be enabled
to recoup the amount spent.”34 Bayer then brought the issue to the
Mumbai High Court, which dismissed the issue noting: “we don’t see
a reason to interfere with the order passed by IPAB, and therefore,
the case is dismissed.”35 Lastly, Bayer filed a petition with the
28.

Marciel Estavillo, India Grants First Compulsory License, for Bayer
Cancer Drug at Intel, I.P. WATCH (Dec. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/03/12/india-grants-first-compulsorylicence-for-bayer-cancer-drug/ [https://perma.cc/DJ9H-52ST].

29.

Id.

30.

Jerome H. Reichman, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions,
UNCTAD-ICTSD 1 (2003),
http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/cs_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WXF8-XKWW].

31.

Natco Pharm. Ltd. v. Bayer Corp.,(2011) C.L.A.No.1 (India), available
at
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipoNew/compulsory_License_12032012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CW8Y-5FAS].

32.

Estavillo, supra note 28.

33.

Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, et. al., Order No. 45/2013 (India).

34.

Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, et al. (Bayer Corp. v. India), Order No.
223/2012 (India), available at http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-2232012-OA-35-2012-PT-MUM.pdf [http://perma.cc/BDT3-PY32].

35.

Bombay High Court Refused to Interfere with IPAB Order in Nexavar
Compulsory License Case, LEXORBIS (July 16, 2014),
http://www.lexorbis.com/bombay-high-court-refused-to-interfere-withipab-order-in-nexavar-compulsory-license-case/#acceptLicense
[https://perma.cc/D7A7-G67T].
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Supreme Court of India, which refused to entertain Bayer’s Special
Leave Petition against the Mumbai High Court’s decision.36
This recent sequence of events illustrates the inevitable dilemma
created by an international agreement restricting a pharmaceutical
company’s remedies to the judicial system of the compulsory licenseissuing nation. Bayer diligently appealed to the adequate courts in
India and followed protocol, but was denied actual appellate review.
India’s high court and Supreme Court refused to entertain the appeal
and gave deference to the decision of the IPAB. Simultaneously,
Bayer was forced to engage in a public relations battle against a
nation that seemingly afforded the pharmaceutical company appellate
review but in fact dismissed the matter.
B. Public Relations Battles are a Waste of Resources

When pharmaceutical companies like Bayer must use financial
resources to defend their intellectual property, they divest funds from
research and development. On average, pharmaceutical companies
spend one-third of all sales revenue on marketing their products,37 and
an average of $4 billion on research and development for a single
drug.38 Arguably, pharmaceutical companies also enjoy the highest
profit margins on the market. For example, Pfizer, the world’s largest
pharmaceutical company, ended 2013 with a 42 percent profit
margin.39 While the amounts spent on advertising seem excessive and
irrational, the public fails to consider the reasons why pharmaceutical
companies must invest such large sums in marketing. In addition to
the standard cost of maintaining public interest, pharmaceutical
companies are constantly fighting a public relations battle.40 In today’s
36.

Supreme Court Says No to Bayer, Upholds Compulsory License on
Nexavar, INFO JUSTICE (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://infojustice.org/archives/33690 [https://perma.cc/7D8N-JZ5K]
(last visited Mar. 13, 2015).

37.

Pharmaceutical Industry, WHO, available at
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/en/
[https://perma.cc/5RBP-WU94] (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).

38.

Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs,
FORBES (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-trulystaggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/HK38KMA4].

39.

Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits,
BBC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business28212223 [https://perma.cc/AB8U-P6DF].

40.

Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies, N.Y. BOOKS
(July 15, 2004), available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/jul/15/the-truthabout-the-drug-companies/ [https://perma.cc/R7L7-UHKD].
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age, pharmaceutical companies are both revered and hated by the
public for their innovations and unsightly escalating drug costs.
In 1998, thirty-nine multinational pharmaceutical companies sued
Nelson Mandela and the South African government challenging
legislation that would allow the South African government to
“purchase brand-name drugs at the lowest rates available anywhere in
the world,” without prior approval.41 Pharmaceutical companies
alleged the legislation violated the South African constitution and the
TRIPS agreement.42 During the three-year legal dispute,
pharmaceutical companies closed factories and canceled investments
in South Africa.43 Initially, the United States government supported
the pharmaceutical industry’s claim by withholding trade benefits and
threatening trade sanctions against South Africa.44 International
public outrage at the pharmaceutical companies’ seemingly insensitive
actions forced the United States to withdraw support, and prompted
the eventual negotiations between pharmaceutical companies and the
In the end, the pharmaceutical
South African government.45
companies conceded that South African law could be implemented as
it was, and agreed to pay the South African government’s legal
costs.46
This case demonstrates the futility of raging a political war
against nations attempting to increase access to lifesaving drugs.
Pharmaceutical companies failed to overturn the legislation, severely
damaged their public image and lost an estimated $286,000 in court
costs.47 J.P. Garnier, chief executive of GlaxoSmithKlein, said in

41.

Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Maker Drop South Africa Suit Over AIDS
Medicine at Intel, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/20/world/drug-makers-drop-southafrica-suit-over-aids-medicine.html [https://perma.cc/C5WK-HX2W].

42.

Joel Lexchin, Canada and access to medicines in developing countries:
intellectual property rights first, Globalization and Health (2013),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3844468/pdf/17448603-9-42.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4NV-YZYH].

43.

Swarns, supra note 41.

44.

1998: Big Pharma Versus Nelson Mandela, M.S.F. ACCESS (Jan. 2009),
http://www.msfaccess.org/content/1998-big-pharma-versus-nelsonmandela [https://perma.cc/Z7UE-G96G].

45.

Swarns, supra note 41.

46.

WILLIAM W. FISHER III & CYRILL P. RIGAMONTI, THE SOUTH AFRICA
AIDS CONTROVERSY: A CASE STUDY IN PATENT LAW AND POLICY 9
(2005), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LJC7-2CFG].

47.

Ann M. Simmons, Suit Against Cheap AIDS Drugs Ends in S. Africa at
Intel, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2001), available at
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response to the decision to withdraw the lawsuit, “[w]e have never
been opposed to wider access. We have discounted our drugs. We’ve
done everything we could. Frankly, the legislation was the worst
distraction. It did not allow us to communicate our message
effectively.”48 When pharmaceutical companies feel apprehensive over
the degree of patent protection awarded in a given country, they will
respond defensively. Such defensive actions contribute to the high
marketing costs spent by pharmaceutical companies to maintain
customer loyalty in light of bad public presence and to obtain new
customers.
Despite the disappointing outcome of the South African
legislation challenge, pharmaceutical companies launched a similar
attack on the Brazilian government in 2001.49 Brazil’s 1997 legislation
reserved the “right to authorize a local company to produce ARVs50
without the permission of the patent holder, regardless of the
pharmaceutical company’s country of origin.”51 Pharmaceutical
companies felt threatened by the implications of such legislation and
urged the United States to challenge the legislation at the WTO
conference in Qatar.52 In January 2001, the U.S. Trade Representative
filed a complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body against
Brazil’s patent laws authorizing compulsory licensing.53 As a result of
heavy international criticism, the U.S. Trade Representative withdrew
the complaint on June 25, 2001.54 Brazil, however, privately agreed to
give the United States advanced notice of any future plans to issue
compulsory licenses.55
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/20/news/mn-53295
[https://perma.cc/WE8H-HVPY].
48.

Swarns, supra note 41.

49.

Mount, supra note 8.

50.

Standard antiretroviral therapy (ART) consists of a combination of at
least three antiretroviral (ARV) drugs to suppress HIV. As explanation,
see Use of Antiretrovirals for Treatment and Prevention of HIV
Infection, WHO, available at
http://www.who.int/hiv/topics/treatment/en/ [https://perma.cc/687YVZAR] (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).

51.

Mount, supra note 8.

52.

Mount, supra note 8.

53.

Jennryn Wetzler & Ana Ayala, Timeline on Brazil’s Compulsory
Licensing, PROGRAM INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. WASH. C. L. AM. U.
(2008), available at
https://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/download.cfm?downloadfile=9C010
7B5-DE2F-4E48-6CE8D03F4933FCD4 [https://perma.cc/3TXWU3VC].

54.

Id.

55.

Id.
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Ineffective intellectual protection drives pharmaceutical companies
to respond defensively to national efforts to increase access. This
aggressive behavior, and the public relations nightmare it creates,
feeds into the vicious cycle of increasing pharmaceutical costs. The
pharmaceutical industry, like all other industries, must bear the cost
of market competition and particularly the cost of generic drug
alternatives. Amending public image problems should not be added to
the steep marketing costs.
C. Orphan Diseases

The top ten largest pharmaceutical companies in the world,
controlling one-third of the pharmaceutical industry, are all located in
first-world countries and mainly supported by the private sector.56 In
first-world countries, both private and public funding supports
research and development for the sake of innovation and much of the
funding benefits the medical field. In the U.S., the National Institute
of Health’s research underpinned five of America’s twenty best selling
drugs.57 Unfortunately, developing nations do not enjoy the same type
of financial support available to research organizations in the first
world. Under this framework, pharmaceutical companies lack the
incentive to invest in the research and development necessary to
create treatments for orphan diseases, rare diseases affecting a small
number of individuals, because they would prefer to allow government
funded institutions to bear that risk.
In the United States, an orphan disease is one that affects fewer
than 200,000 people nationwide, but in Japan it’s fewer than 50,000
individuals, and fewer than 2,000 in Australia.58 The different
thresholds are proportional to the nation’s population size, and
indicate the baseline of affected individuals necessary to spike
pharmaceutical interest. The difference, however, is that first-world
countries spend billions of dollars on research across all fields.59 Given
the high cost of research and development, pharmaceutical companies
lack the incentive to research these rare diseases because the return
rate is unlikely to cover the expense of the research or produce profit.
56.

Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 37.

57.

Cutting American Health Research Will Harm the World, supra note 7.

58.

J.K. Aronson, Rare Diseases and Orphan Drugs, 61 BRIT. J CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 243, 243-45 (2006), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1885017/
[https://perma.cc/4C92-L2X6]; Orphan Products: Hope for People with
Rare Diseases, FDA (2012),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143563.ht
m [https://perma.cc/Y5TS-RHKZ].

59.

Cutting American Health Research Will Harm the World, supra note 7
(indicating that in 2011 the U.S. and the E.U. countries spent a
combined $641 billion on research, while China spent $160 billion).
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Developed nations address the orphan disease problem by
inducing research and development through subsidies. A subsidy
system for pharmaceutical research and development functions like
insurance coverage: the risk is spread amongst all taxpayers who may
or may not benefit from the results of the innovation.60 Countries like
the United States, Japan, Australia, and the European Community
mitigate the problem of orphan diseases by passing legislation
encouraging research through “tax credits and research aids,
simplification of marketing authorization procedures, and extended
market exclusivity.”61 Orphan disease issues are more prominent in
developing countries where government funds cannot be allocated to
treat rare diseases.
Developing drugs for orphan diseases is not cost-effective
according to market standards; so pharmaceutical giants with the
resources to tackle the problem but largely driven by profit margins
remain apathetic to the needs of those afflicted by orphan diseases.
Drugs that benefit the industrialized nations are prioritized over drugs
that can benefit countries with individuals that are unable to pay the
price of innovation.62 Under a framework of international laws
securing a fair return on medical innovation, pharmaceutical
companies could be enticed to fund research for orphan diseases.
While the projects would not be categorized as lucrative, the eventual
payoff of the initial investment and improved public image would
suffice to incentivize pharmaceutical companies to undertake the
research. Moreover, once return rates are globally coordinated,
pharmaceutical companies can offset the cost of research for orphan
diseases from their more successful products.
D. Rise in the Counterfeit Drug Market

Disproportionately high prices and limited access to name brand
medicines exacerbate the counterfeit drug market problem. The WHO
explains, “[w]hen prices of medicines are high and price differentials
between identical products exists there is a greater incentive to supply
cheap counterfeit medicines.”63 The counterfeit drug market functions
by supplying counterfeit drugs through traditional distribution

60.

See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 314-15 (2013).

61.

Aronson, supra note 58, at 244.

62.

Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 37.

63.

General Information on Counterfeit Medicines, WHO (Feb. 2006),
available at
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/index1
.html [https://perma.cc/4QHC-PPVV].
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channels or directly to consumers.64 A counterfeit drug is “one which
is deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to identity
and/or source.”65
The inability to regulate the creation or distribution of counterfeit
drugs creates a number of risks to public health. While some
individuals might consciously purchase counterfeit drugs, the majority
are inadvertent recipients of subpar medications.66 Counterfeit drugs
“may include [products with the] correct ingredients but with fake
packaging, with the wrong ingredients, without active ingredients or
with insufficient active ingredients.”67The most dangerous counterfeit
drugs are those with incorrect compositions because of their potential
health effects. For example, more than 500 people, mostly children,
died from consuming medications “fraudulently or [] mistake[nly]”
containing diethylene glycol, a poisonous solvent.68
In addition to the health risk associated with counterfeit drugs,
the healthcare industry must worry about the public’s lost sense of
faith in the healthcare system. Many individuals with access to
regular pharmaceutical treatments are skeptical of the system’s ability
to produce positive results. Counterfeit drugs on the market only
serve to reinforce apprehension against modern medicine.

64.

Growing Threat from Counterfeit Medicines, WHO (Apr. 2010),
available at https://www/who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/4/10-020410/en/
[https://perma.cc/LX5Z-6FFY] (asserting that “international trade
presents easy opportunities for counterfeiters to insert their products
into the supply chain of legitimate pharmaceuticals and to disguise the
source.”).

65.

General Information on Counterfeit Medicines, supra note 63.

66.

See THE REAL DANGERS OF COUNTERFEIT DRUGS, PHARMA, available at
http://pharma.webpackaging.com/issue1/healthcare/anticounterfeiting/the-real-dangers-of-counterfeit-drugs/
[https://perma.cc/JK5W-BMRU] (last visited Mar. 14, 2015) (observing
that easy access to popular drugs on the Internet since the late 1990s
has led some unsuspecting buyers to purchase counterfeit drugs, while
other consumers deliberately buy counterfeit drugs to avoid high
treatment costs).

67.

Anna Gu, The Fight Against Counterfeit and Substandard
Pharmaceuticals by Governments, International Agencies, and
Professional Societies, in 1 COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES: POLICY,
ECONOMICS, AND COUNTERMEASURES 53, 53-54 (Albert I. Wertheimer &
Perry G. Wang, eds., 2012).

68.

Counterfeit Drugs: Guidelines for the Development of Measures to
Combat Counterfeit Drugs, WHO 13 (1999), available at
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Jh1456e/4.html
[https://perma.cc/L4DA-PJ48]; see generally L. J. Schep et al.,
Diethylene Glycol Poisoning, 47 CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY 525, 525-35
(2009).
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V. Proposal: An International Panel of Neutral
Individuals
A potential solution to the problems that arise from having an
uncoordinated, decentralized system is to establish an International
Panel that will review national decisions to ensure that
pharmaceutical companies receive adequate return on investments
while ensuring that market prices reflect the ability of countries to
pay for drugs. This body’s impartial nature will allow the members to
determine the common interests between the issuing country and the
pharmaceutical company that transcend beyond national interests.
A. Special Board

Disputes arising out of TRIPS are governed by the dispute
settlement system instituted by the WTO and subject to the general
rules and procedures for management of disputes.69 This system seeks
to maintain a balance between the obligations and rights of members
by addressing instances of unfair outcomes as a result of measures
taken by other members.70 The dispute settlement mechanism
instituted by the WTO is inadequate for resolving compulsory license
disputes for pharmaceutical patents because pharmaceutical
companies cannot appeal compulsory license decisions directly to a
designated board. Further, the international health crisis distinguishes
itself from all other intellectual property conflicts by its indisputable
effect on human existence. Moreover, the effectiveness of the dispute
settlement system continues to face criticism especially in regards to
the developing nations’ ability to access the system and devote
financial and legal resources to make it effective.71 Here, the
International Panel will specifically focus on coordinating payments
by countries to achieve a global system that induces the right amount
of investment and distributes costs among countries based on their
ability to pay.
International support for the institution of an International Panel
specifically created to address compulsory license disputes will remove
the stigma associated with challenging compulsory licenses. A
compulsory license is not intrinsically unfair, but may be unfair as
applied/ in practice due to inadequate royalty rates. Marked economic
differences and bargaining power disparities between Brazil and South
69.

Viviana Muñoz Tellez, Dispute Settlement Under the TRIPS Agreement:
The United States-Brazil (2000) and United States-Argentina (2002)
Patent Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE INTERPRETATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 215,
215 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010).

70.

Id.

71.

Id. at 216.
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Africa depict a perfect illustration of how a neutral board could
sanction each government’s respective compulsory license, but under
different terms. Shedding the stigma and allowing transparent review
of compulsory licensing applications will benefit pharmaceutical
companies, governments, and consumers.
B. Board Composition

The International Panel will be composed of seven standing
members and closely resemble the Appellate Body of the WTO. Like
the Appellate Body of the WTO, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
will appoint each member of the International Panel.72 The DSB is
“made up of all member governments, usually represented by
ambassadors,” thus, assuring uniform international representation.73
Members of the WTO Appellate Body must be “individuals with
recognized authority . . . demonstrated expertise in law, international
trade and the subject-matter of the covered agreements generally.”74
Following this example, the International Panel members must meet
the same qualification with additional expertise in patent law and the
pharmaceutical industry. Further, a staff of experts on investment in
risk and innovation will support the members. Additionally, the
members must be unaffiliated with any government, and be “broadly
representative of the Membership of the WTO.”75 Each member will
be elected for a four-year term, with the possibility of being
reappointed once.76 Board members will be subject to the Rules of
Conduct for the Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes.77 Using this method for selecting board
members will ensure each compulsory license is subject to the same
review process and free of national bias.
C. Review Process

The International Panel will have appellate review over the
remuneration established by the government issuing a compulsory
license and will only entertain cases of compulsory licenses for
pharmaceutical patents. The board can juxtapose the pharmaceutical
72.

Appellate Body, WTO, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/9NU6-8T8X] (last visited Jan 25, 2015) [Appellate
Body Members, WTO].

73.

Dispute Settlement, WTO, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/NP62-X4CL] (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).

74.

Appellate Body Members, WTO, supra note 72.
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Appellate Body Members, WTO, supra note 72.
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Appellate Body Members, WTO, supra note 72.

77.

Appellate Body Members, WTO, supra note 72.

411

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016)
A Fair Return Approach to Pharmaceutical Compulsory Licensing

company’s research and development costs and other factors it sees fit
with the nation’s need and accessibility concerns, taking into account
the revenue that the pharmaceutical company earns from domestic
sales and in other countries. Parties to a dispute will be expected to
meet evidence thresholds to support their positions. Pharmaceutical
companies challenging a compulsory license will have the burden of
producing records that illustrate the cost to the pharmaceutical
company for the specific drug and the issuing country must produce
evidence of the country’s need for the drug and ability to pay. The
board shall have absolute discretion to construe a party’s failure to
cooperate as evidence of bad faith.
As described earlier, when responding to inadequate royalty
payments, WHO in collaboration with UNDP published an extensive
set of guidelines for establishing “adequate” remuneration that
countries issuing a compulsory license can use to determine adequate
remuneration for a specific drug.78 But these guidelines still produce
unsatisfactory results for pharmaceutical companies. In 2012, India
determined the royalty rate for Bayer’s cancer drug using WHO’s
Remuneration Guidelines but Bayer still appealed the rate.79 The
existing guidelines, including WHO’s Remuneration Guidelines,
impose a rigid equation for establishing adequate remuneration and
tend to focus on concerns specific to the country of origin. So long as
countries are free to choose which guidelines to follow and how to
discount factors, pharmaceutical companies will continue to receive
disagreeable and inconsistent royalty rates. The International Panel
shall make use of the different formulas for remuneration and
introduce flexibility into the calculation process while maintaining
consistency across countries. For example, the board must have
authority to retroactively entertain a dispute for a compulsory license
issued for an emergency situation and design a payment plan so that
the pharmaceutical company can be compensated.
The International Panel will build on the formulas devised by
WHO and other counties without committing to a single mechanism.
The most notable difference between existing considerations and
factors the neutral board will consider will be the capital investment
spent on the specific drug by the pharmaceutical company. In Bayer
v. Natco, Bayer’s challenge to the compulsory license was dismissed
because Bayer’s inability to recover its investment did not pertain to
the issue at hand. The Intellectual Property Appellate Board,
Chennai reasoned that the “expenditure incurred by the appellant is
not the criterion, nor does this chapter intend[] that the patentee be
78.

LOVE, supra note 27.

79.

Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, et al. (Bayer Corp. v. India), Order No.
223/2012 (India), available at http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-2232012-OA-35-2012-PT-MUM.pdf [http://perma.cc/BDT3-PY32]..
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enabled to recoup the amount spent.”80 India, like each government
making the same argument, assumes the pharmaceutical company
recovered its investment from market sales in the developed world.
The fault in that reasoning is that without global coordination and
parallel importation concerns pharmaceutical companies stand to lose
the ability to actually recover their investment.81
In order to secure a fair return for the labor and money-intensive
investments, the International Panel must factor a pharmaceutical
company’s investment costs into their decisions and cannot assume
that the pharmaceutical company will recover the costs exclusively
from the developed countries. Companies will not be awarded higher
royalty rates to meet the company’s marketing needs or surplus
profits but can expect to receive a fair return rate consistent with the
monetary investments on research and development. Because not all
drugs are successful and the incentive of pharmaceutical companies to
invest in research and development depends on their ability to offset
losses from some drugs with profits from their more successful drugs,
pharmaceutical companies must be permitted to recover the cost of
successful drugs. Pharmaceutical companies will need to provide
extensive records of spending costs over the years and detailed
accounts of the labor in order to fairly assess royalty rates. Although
pharmaceutical companies will be reluctant to produce these
documents, they will be incentivized by the higher likelihood of
obtaining fair compensation if they comply.
Litigation costs before the International Panel can replace the
cost of futile challenges to the issuing country’s judicial system, and
the public relations costs of protecting public image. The
establishment of the International Panel should cause a sizable
redistribution of spending that should reduce marketing costs in the
long run. Eventually, the decision of the International Panel shall
serve as precedent for future compulsory licenses, but it is crucial that
countries and pharmaceutical companies alike continue to have access
to this impartial review.
D. Authority

The Panel will be given authority to make final decisions on all
compulsory matters under the supervision of WTO members. In
accordance with WTO ideals, the decision to institute the board and
the determination of its powers will be a product of a majority
member decision. A declaration amending the original TRIPS
agreement must therefore be brought into effect so that the board can
80.

Bayer Corp. v. India, Order No. 223/2012.

81.

Parallel Imports occur when a country imports a drug from another
country where a lower price is charged for the drug. See Sykes, supra
note 3, at 57.
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function with the support of the international community. The United
Nations has designated forty-eight countries as least-developed
countries, thirty-four of which are currently members of the WTO.82
The WTO’s process for making collective decisions involving all
member nations83 and its broad international representation render the
WTO the appropriate international organization to empower the
International Panel to preside over compulsory license issues.
The International Panel’s decisions will be appealable to the
WTO Appellate Body, which shall be the only entity with authority
to overturn the International Panel’s decision. Once the International
Panel reaches a decision, the decision will be binding on both parties
unless appealed to the WTO Appellate Body. Given the International
Panel’s flexibility and impartial interest in the subject matter, the
number of appeals to the WTO Appellate Body should be minimal.
The neutral board shall have full authority to impose trade sanctions
against any country refusing to comply with its resolutions. The
Panel’s decisions must preempt national law and thus reinforce the
notion of fairness for both parties involved.
If a dispute arises between a country that is not a member of the
WTO and a member-country, the board may extend temporary
member status to the country for that proceeding. This temporary
member status will be contingent on a contractual obligation to be
bound by the International Panel’s final decision. Failure to adhere to
the stipulations of the International Panel will result in trade
sanctions. Additionally, the non-member country will be added to the
WTO observer status country list, where the country will have the
ability to follow discussions on subjects that pertain to them.84 If the
non-member country abstains from WTO jurisdiction, the
pharmaceutical company must resort to resolving the dispute through
the WTO’s dispute settlement system or the issuing country’s judicial
system.

VI. Conclusion
This Note has reviewed the shortcomings of compulsory licensing
under the current framework of TRIPS and proposed the institution
82.

Least Developed Countries, WTO, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/47RT-7JQX] (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).

83.

Whose WTO is it Anyway, WTO, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/LAL9-QUGZ] (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).

84.

International Intergovernmental Organizations Granted Observer Status
to WTO Bodies, WTO, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/igo_obs_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/67U5-6B5S] (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
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of an International Panel with appellate review to exclusively
entertain cases of compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical
innovations. This Note does not suggest countries should forego initial
attempts to obtain voluntary licenses, but instead provides patent
holders a greater opportunity to obtain a fair return on their
inventions even under compulsory licenses. Ultimately, the goal is to
increase universal access to lifesaving drugs, but monetary constrains
create a conflict of interest between investing in research and
development and fair returns. The conflict of interest must be
resolved by a third party, a neutral body of individuals, tasked with
equalizing
costs
across
national
borders.
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